Are Spurs Relishing A More Frank Approach?

From European glory to surviving relegation—was Postecoglou’s exit really justified?

No one ever really knows what to expect from a Tottenham season. After stumbling to a miserable 17th-place finish in the Premier League last year, fans clung to one silver lining—ending a 17-year trophy drought with European glory.

But it wasn’t just the supporters. Head Coach Ange Postecoglou admitted he had prioritised the Europa League at the earliest opportunity, a move some saw as a face-saving tactic to distract from their dismal league form. Whatever his reasoning, the gamble delivered on the pitch—but still wasn’t enough to save his job. Raising a debate that has fans divided: should lifting silverware grant a head coach immunity from the sack? For Spurs under former owner Daniel Levy, the answer was a resounding no. As the streets of North London echoed with Spurs fans’ playful take on a Robbie Williams classic—“I’m loving Big Postecoglou instead”—Levy was, in fact, loving Thomas Frank a little more. But why? How did Postecoglou lose the Spurs hierarchy’s backing? Last season provides us with some clues.

Fruitful beginnings

Last season brought a tangible sense of optimism among fans, motivated by Postecoglou’s clear reminder that he always wins a trophy in his second season. For a club long hampered by inconsistency and caution, Postecoglou’s direct, front-footed approach signaled a potential route out of underachievement and toward silverware contention. If the early weeks of last season were anything to go by, little seemed to shake that belief.

Across their opening 12 matches, Spurs averaged a non-penalty expected goals (npxG) difference of 0.79—bettered only by Manchester City (0.85) and Liverpool (1.12) at that stage—some signs of early momentum. Their league-best rolling npxG of 1.94 showcased Postecoglou’s uncompromising attacking intent, even if, as some suspected, it came at the expense of some defensive stability and overall balance.

However, Spurs’ attacking prowess wasn’t quite mirrored at the other end—their rolling npxG against of 1.15 ranked just 7th in the league at that stage, and a points return of 1.58 per 90 (6th) fell short of what their attacking dominance promised. Still, it was hardly enough evidence to leave Spurs fans and the club hierarchy feeling overly concerned.

Postecoglou’s Spurs: Non-Penalty xG—For vs. Against

Premier League | Seasons 2024/25

But concerns began to mount as Postecoglou reached a period of steady decline. Defensive frailties, compounded by injuries to key personnel and his unwavering insistence on matching opponents blow for blow in attack, saw Spurs’ fortunes spiral. The numbers made it clear: Postecoglou’s intention to out-gun opponents and mask any defensive deficiencies was failing.

By mid-season, Spurs’ 6-match rolling npxG against had soared to 2.62—the highest of any Premier League side at any point across the entire campaign. And so, with Postecoglou offering little in terms of compromise, the pressure to keep producing goal-scoring opportunities at the same relentless pace only intensified as the flood of goal-scoring opportunities they were conceding spiralled out of control.

It didn’t take long for Premier League opposition to expose the naiveties in Postecoglou’s approach. In build-up, Spurs often lacked subtlety and situational awareness, insisting on forcing progressive passes through compact lines of opposition pressure. On occassion, you’d expect to see teams vary their intent—not always trying to play through the lines under pressure, but instead recycling possession deeper, briefly conceding territory to reset the build-up.

Alternatively, teams in these scenarios might bypass the press altogether, relieving pressure by playing long. While this carries the risk of turnovers, it shifts them further upfield, allowing a chance to contest second balls—a far less damaging outcome than losing possession near their own goal. Spurs, however, stuck rigidly to protocol and were often exposed. Worse still, Postecoglou’s disregard for the dangers of transition meant his side rarely showed the positioning or immediacy required to suppress threats at source.

To Postecoglou’s credit, his possession-first mantra isn’t exactly novel. In fact, since Pep Guardiola arrived in the Premier League in 2016, many coaches have built successful teams around possession-heavy styles. But as modern football evolves, new ideas surface. While Postecoglou and others sought to chase perfect control, some coaches began to appreciate the flipside: as keeping the ball became the priority, turnovers in dangerous areas were always bound to rise—and could be ruthlessly exploited against teams temporarily caught out of shape. Something Postecoglou became painfully familiar with.

But a deeper look into Spur's directness during buildup—measured via the Possession Directness Index (PDI)—revealed a willingness from Postecoglou to deviate from his possession-first principles. In fact, when comparing the second half of the season to the first, Spurs exhibited more buildup variation than any other side except Chelsea. Aston Villa (+0.039), Spurs (+0.04) and Chelsea (+0.059) showed the greatest swings in PDI, while clubs like Everton (0.04), Arsenal (-0.048) and Ipswich (-0.053) remained much more consistent in how directly they built their attacks.

The problem? Spurs couldn’t adapt—and who could blame them? Mid-season, a seismic overhaul in their approach was always going to stumble. For more pragmatic, versatile coaches, adjustments like these are typically clearer and more quickly absorbed by players, due to their familiarity with adapting within varied frameworks. But for coaches like Postecoglou, more deeply rooted to their in-possession principles, mid-season tweaks can backfire: the confusion they generate often outweighs the intended tactical benefits, making it easy to see why adaptation midstream was so difficult.

The Table Never Lies...

It’s often said that after any 38-game season, you finish where you deserve. Perhaps. In Spurs’ case, though, there was little doubt. Postecoglou’s side suffered 22 league defeats—the most ever by a team that avoided relegation. Their total of 38 points was the lowest of the Premier League era, a tally that in four other seasons would have seen them relegated and in three more would have left them surviving only on goal difference. Their safety owed largely to last seasons' three promoted sides, who together formed the lowest-scoring relegated trio the league has ever seen.

Of course, injuries were an extenuating factor—and Spurs were certainly plagued by them. Yet many questioned how much of that was self-inflicted, a consequence of Postecoglou’s early-season insistence on a relentlessly high-intensity style. But this wasn’t just about injuries. Spurs simply struggled to compete, suffering defeats to clubs with far fewer resources—stark evidence that the issues were far more systemic, rooted deeply in Postecoglou’s ideas.

Did Spurs Finish Where They Belonged?

Premier League | Season 2024/25

In the end, there was little room for Postecoglou to hide—personified none more so than when digging into Spurs’ expected versus actual league position. Some teams managed to defy expectations: Nottingham Forest soared to 7th, four places above their projected 11th. On the contrary, Bournemouth finished 9th, falling four places below their expected 5th. Spurs, by contrast, barely moved the needle—projected to finish 16th, they limped in just one spot lower at 17th, leaving scarcely any room for comfort. There were no extenuating circumstances to suggest otherwise, consolidating the notion that they truly finished where they deserved.

Speculation aside, Postecoglou's fate always felt somewhat inevitable. If Spurs’ leadership were willing to follow the data rather than be swayed by the lingering excitement of Europa League success, only one result was ever likely—and it happened. Levy made the decisive move, replacing Ange Postecoglou with former Brentford boss, Thomas Frank.

Some fans were left underwhelmed by the news, unsure whether Frank’s approach, adjudged to be more pragmatic, could satisfy Spurs’ fans appetite for attacking football. Yet similar expectations had shaped the circumstances that led to Postecoglou’s arrival—and look how that turned out. Perhaps Levy’s change in approach, albeit unfamiliar and uncomfortable, might just be exactly what's needed.

Why Thomas Frank?

It’s rare for a new head coach to arrive after a season that included Champions League football. Such campaigns usually signal success, yet often trigger change in their aftermath. Frank has not yet faced the challenge of juggling domestic and European demands, but there’s no questioning the quality of his work at Brentford—leaving behind a side that's difficult to beat, aggressive in offense and dynamic in transition, securing two top-half Premier League finishes: 10th last season and 9th in 2022–23—all achieved under exceptionally tight constraints. Delivering strong results on the pitch while keeping costs low off it—a blueprint Daniel Levy would no doubt love to replicate at Spurs.

In most cases, clubs that spend heavily on wages attract the best players, which usually translates into stronger results on the pitch. Brentford, however, have built a reputation as serial overachievers by following a different path. Under owner Matthew Benham, the club has embraced a data-driven model that prioritises value: investing smart, selling for profit, and keeping their wage bill under strict control.

Frank’s remit was clear but challenging—maximise on-field performance with limited spending power, even as the club's top talents are to be cherry-picked one-by-one. Neal Maupay, Ollie Watkins, Ivan Toney, Bryan Mbeumo, David Raya, and Ezri Konsa have all moved on. Yet despite the turnover of players, Frank maintained a strong culture and unified dressing room—the kind of foundation Spurs have long struggled to build.

Points per Game vs. Player's Salary Expenditure

Premier League | Seasons 2021/22-Present

According to Capology, since the start of the 2021–22 season, Frank has delivered an average 1.32 points per game (PPG), all while operating on a average weekly wage bill (AWWB) of just over £760,000. Of the 27 Premier League clubs assessed, Brentford rank 11th highest for PPG, and 4th lowest for AWWB, demonstrating their exceptional efficiency.

Putting this into sharper context, clubs promoted to the Premier League over the same period have managed just 0.90 PPG on an average AWWB just shy of £925,000—underscoring Frank’s ability to outperform the promoted cohort while operating at significantly leaner cost.

Other notable mentions include Brighton, who spent slightly more than Brentford across the period with an AWWB in excess of £1.1 Million (m) but having delivered an impressive 1.46 PPG. By contrast, big spenders Manchester United's have been operating on an AWWB more than five times that of Brentford, but without the PPG return one would expect. For every point per game averaged, Brentford spent approximately £579,000, compared to Manchester United’s staggering £2.64m.

As for Spurs, they occupy a kind of limbo. With an AWWB of £2.28m, their spending trails the traditional top six by a hefty margin—the nearest being £565,000 behind. Unsurprisingly, their PPG lags too, save for Manchester United, but perhaps the real headache for the Spurs' hieracy is Newcastle (1.62) and Aston Villa (1.58), who, with lower outlays, arguably shouldn’t be outperforming Spurs.

Many fans blame Levy’s refusal to match the top six in spending for Spurs’ lack of competitiveness, but with lower-budget sides outpacing them, Frank’s arrival may signal Levy’s intention to lean on the Brentford blueprint Frank knows best—squeezing maximum performance from every resource available, not outspending but outsmarting the competition.

What Can We Expect?

If his stint at Spurs echoes his Brentford days, expect a coach who tailors his game plan to every opponent, shifting seamlessly between styles in and out of possession. His reputation as one of the league’s most adaptable tacticians already speaks for itself. At Brentford, many pegged him as a direct, pragmatic operator—his side averaged just below 49% possession, the 6th lowest in the league last season. But Frank has always pushed back on that narrative, insisting it was a matter of circumstance. With fewer elite technicians at his disposal, he simply found other ways to go toe-to-toe with the league’s best.

Brentford's Playstyle Under Thomas Frank

Premier League | Seasons 2021–22 to 2024–25

Since their arrival to the Premier League, Brentford have typically sat between 17th and 12th in the PDI—a reflection of Thomas Frank’s tendency to be more direct in possession. Yet the numbers tell another story: the Bees were evolving. Their play has grown more possession-oriented, with slower, more intricate build-up. That shift was evident last season as they climbed from 17th to 12th in PDI, finishing 10th—their best return since a 9th-place finish in 2022/23. It’s a timely reminder for Spurs supporters worried about the team becoming overly pragmatic or defensive-minded. Frank appears set to introduce more balance than the previous regime—less direct than his typical Brentford approach, but significantly more inclined to exploit the channels than Postecoglou ever was.

For a side more willing to go long than most, you might expect Frank to sit back and rely on a resilient low-block? But this wasn't the case. In fact, outside a handful of the traditional big six, Brentford ranked 2nd for turnovers in the opponent’s half (307), just 6 behind Spurs (313). Spurs completed 2,766 final-third pressures—second only to Brighton (2,840)—yet Brentford were far more efficient, converting pressures into turnovers with only 2,187 pressures performed, while Postecoglou’s Spurs generated activity without the discipline and structure to recover the ball as often.

Still Early Days, But...

Now that we’re a few games into the season, it’s time to lift the curtain and see what lies ahead. What has come to fruition, and what surprises have emerged? For Thomas Frank and Spurs, it’s been a mixed bag—but steady optimism remains. With 6 points from a possible 9, including a well-earned 2-0 victory over Pep’s Manchester City, fans have reasons to be encouraged, though the 1-0 home defeat to a resilient Bournemouth side tempers some of that excitement.

With just three matches played, the sample size is limited and metrics are more heavily shaped by the opposition teams they encounter, but meaningful insights exist nonetheless. In possession, it’s interesting to uncover where the relative majority of activity occurs, and for Spurs, early signs already reveal a distinct facet of Frank’s attacking intent.

Where Are Spurs Most Threatening?

Premier League | Season 2025/26

Reminiscent of Frank’s Brentford sides of seasons past, Spurs have wasted no time doubling down on strong wing play—shifting possession into the channels and leaning on sharp combinations between wingers, full-backs, and outside forwards to exploit space. Rather than lingering in heavy circulation or prolonged probing, they look to deliver into the box the moment an opening appears. It’s little surprise, then, to see them ranked 4th in the league for crosses attempted (16.3 per 90) and 2nd for crosses completed (4.3 per 90).

Their Expected Threat (xT) numbers tell a similar story. Both full-backs, Pedro Porro and Djed Spence, sit top of the squad for threat created, almost exclusively from wide areas. Porro’s impact comes largely from his deliveries into the channels for Kudus and into the box from the right, accounting for 0.65 of his 0.74 xT. On the opposite flank, Spence has generated the most threat from carries (0.19). While less prolific than Porro in delivering into the box, his progressive ball-carrying makes him a much needed outlet, especially in transition.

Breaking down carries by zone, Brennan Johnson leads the way, producing the highest xT from the attacking left flank. Close behind is Mohammed Kudus, Spurs’ livewire on the right. He ranked 2nd for carry threat in a single zone and finished just behind Spence overall. Armed with blistering pace and a natural knack for beating defenders one-on-one, Kudus is almost impossible to pin down, constantly carving out space for teammates—a spark that makes him one of the most thrilling prospects Spurs have this season.

Bright Beginnings...

Spurs’ strong wing play paid dividends in their opening matches against Burnley and Manchester City, with tactical adjustments tailored to each opponent’s strengths. In both games, game-state played a key role. After taking an early lead, Spurs’ opponents pressed aggressively, creating a recurring pattern: as more players pushed forward, Richarlison found pockets of space between the lines, driving Spurs’ attacks from deeper areas—so much so that he leads Spurs in xT from central areas just inside the opposition half.

By pulling central defenders out of shape, Richarlison unlocked space for Kudus and Johnson—either to stay wide and isolate their markers one-on-one or to cut inside and burst into the gaps he left behind. Against Manchester City, these threats became even more pronounced down to their aggressive pressing—unsurprising, given the recent arrival of Pep Linders, whose hallmark is high-intensity pressure out-of-possesion.

Time and again, City went man-to-man, even pushing an extra forward onto Guglielmo Vicario to pin Spurs’ goalkeeper. The consequence? A wide-open two-versus-two: Kudus and Johnson directly against John Stones and Rúben Dias—the exact scenario Frank would have welcomed. As Kudus and Johnson maintained the width and height, the horizontal distance Stones and Dias needed to cover became too great. This allowed Porro to exploit the flanks with his characteristic fast, accurate channel balls, a pattern that directly led to Spurs’ opening goal.

When the opposition dropped into a low block—as Burnley did for spells—Spurs were forced to confront a different test but still carried plenty of threat. Admitedly, circumstances were favorable: protecting an early lead against a back line that sat unnecessarily deep and lacked the cohesion and intensity to set pressing traps higher up the pitch. That allowed Spurs to find clear channels into wide areas with little resistance. From there, Johnson and Kudus wreaked havoc in one-on-one situations, forcing Burnley to commit extra bodies just to contain them. Leaving room for the likes of Porro and Spence to surge into, or more time and space to deliver dangerous crosses.

Frank’s First Fumble?

A sterner test for Frank's side came at the hands of Andoni Iraola's Bournemouth. A man known for his meticulous attention to detail out-of-possession. Adopted a slightly different approach from the likes of Manchester City and Burnley, Iraola instead set up a hybrid system: a compact mid-block combined with bursts of aggressive pressing on clear triggers. The plan was simple—force Spurs to build down the left, swarm Spence and Johnson, and shut off access to the far more dangerous Kudus–Porro pairing on the opposite flank.

Spurs were funneled into direct balls to Richarlison, which had worked against Manchester City and Burnley—but this time the passes were mistimed and telegraphed, making them easy for the opposition to anticipate. Bournemouth’s Bafodé Diakité hounded him relentlessly, winning duel after duel and forcing constant turnovers. The result? Bournemouth set the season’s single-match high for turnovers, racking up 86, that's 17 more than Spurs—the 2nd largest difference in turnovers between two sides.

Buildup Bottleneck Versus Bournemouth

Premier League | Season 2025/26

Bournemouth fans won’t be surprised: only Burnley has recorded more pressing sequences this season (40 to Bournemouth’s 38). But Burnley also spends more time out of possession than any team apart from Crystal Palace (37.4%). Adjust for that, and Bournemouth still rank among the league’s most aggressive pressers.

But they aren't just busy, they've so far excelled in intensity. Currently the most disruptive side to opposition possession, executing more defensive actions per opposition pass than any other with a PPDA of just 9.6. Frank’s teams—renowned for their dogmatic out-of-possession approach and even ranked 3rd highest for PPDA (10.2) this season—were outclassed in the very facet they usually control. As for how this translated in attack, the contrast in performance couldn't be more evident.

What Lies Ahead...

Despite the disappointment on the field, this match is best viewed in isolation against one of the league’s most clinical operators. The defeat ended Spurs’ brief honeymoon start, but it was the performance itself that raised questions—particularly around Frank’s in-possession ideas. Critics point to a one-dimensional style, overly reliant on wing play, with results often hinging on its success. The absence of James Maddison exposed Spurs’ lack of central creativity, forcing Frank to lean heavily on the wide areas. The recent signing of Dutch international Xavi Simons offers hope for more central penetration—whether Spurs adapt or stick with the wings remains to be seen. This weekend, Spurs take on domestic rivals West Ham at the London Stadium, a hostile stage set to expose more of Frank’s tactical intentions.

However, this week attention has shifted from on-field matters to off-field drama, as Levy’s sudden resignation sent shockwaves through the club. Just months ago, he celebrated Brennan Johnson’s Europa League-winning goal, yet his tenure stretches so far back he was part of Spurs’ fabric long before Johnson was even born. For some, his departure signals a fresh dawn—a chance to move beyond Levy’s famously tight purse strings. For others, it leaves a void, his meticulous, principled management casting lingering uncertainty over the club’s future.

Levy’s critics long argued that his focus on financial stability came at the expense of ambition. Where his tenure faces scrutiny is in turning resources into consistent performance—a challenge compounded by a revolving door of managers. A coherent game model, carried from one head coach to the next, is the ideal for building continuity. Yet the starkly different approaches of Mauricio Pochettino, José Mourinho, Nuno Espírito Santo, Antonio Conte, Ange Postecoglou, and Thomas Frank have repeatedly undermined that vision, leaving Spurs with tactical inconsistency rather than a clear identity.

But it's difficult to teach an old dog new tricks, especially for those at the helm, so accustomed to doing things a certain way. It’s easy to forget that when Levy joined Spurs in December 2000, decisions were made in person, hammered out over tough negotiation and sealed with a handshake. Today, every choice is scrutinised by analytics teams, representatives, media, and fans alike—a level of oversight that exposed one area even Levy would likely admit was a challenge: delegation. Harsh as it may sound, when he started, a hands-on approach was precisely what was needed to get things done. But as times change, you must change with them.

But to compete at the highest level, Spurs need a more integrated approach: financial discipline paired with tactical clarity and a structural identity on the pitch. Levy’s departure may provide the opportunity to finally align ambition with execution. The way Spurs choose to operate moving forward—from recruitment to strategy—will look to define this era. The challenge is simple: financial security is no longer enough; Spurs need a clear identity that maximises performance across every level of the club.

For Frank, looking too far ahead would be an obvious risk, especially with much of the fanbase still cautious after the early optimism of Ange’s tenure ended in disappointment. Yet there are plenty of reasons for hope under Frank’s stewardship: strong performances against West Ham this weekend, coupled with a positive start against Villarreal in the Champions League, won’t do him any harm and should give fans every reason to believe Spurs can reach new heights this season.